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The traditional school of economic policy analysis predicts that globalisation
will give rise to predatory competition between the governments of the
European nation states. The consequence is anticipated to be a marked
reduction in, if not the destruction of, the benevolent Welfare State. The
objective of this contribution is to present the main arguments that have led
us to believe that, this traditional literature notwithstanding, a European
constitution should not restrict but rather should encourage horizontal and
vertical governmental competition. In our view the European political order, in
defining the relationship among member states and also the relationship
between the member states and the EU, ought to be inspired by what we
know about competition in the commercial sphere.
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The landscape of globalisation presents a remarkably rugged appearance. This is true if one
adopts a genuinely global view. Differences in the extent of global market integration are,
however, also discernible if one adopts a narrower European perspective. The European
Union was set up half a century ago with the express purpose of achieving deep economic
integration. Despite the remaining differences in integration among member states, the
initiative has proved to be remarkably successful. The European countries have attained a
level of economic integration that provides substantial static gains from trade and significant
dynamic gains from increased market competition.
Globalisation increases competition among private economic agents, but also among
nation states' governments. The most evident cause of globalisation-induced competition
among governments is the increased mobility of capital, labour, households, and consumers.
Economic agents find themselves increasingly in a position to circumvent government
controls. As a consequence, governments compete more vigorously for mobile factors and tax
bases. This mechanism is still rather weak in most parts of the world, but in Europe
governmental competition has, over the last decades, become a prevalent and noticeable
phenomenon. Contrary to an oft-stated opinion, competition between political-economic
systems did not come to an end with the demise of communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
Globalisation of the Western European economies in the second half of the last century rather
paved the way for an era of unprecedented competition among European nation states.
The political class is averse to competition among governments and is dismissive of the
idea that competition can be beneficial. In this respect the political class is not different from
the business class which, as Adam Smith already remarked more than two hundred years ago,
"seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."
2 If Adam Smith
declared collusion among business people to be a conspiracy against consumers, one would2
expect modern day economists, faced with the phenomenon of globalisation-induced
governmental competition, to stress the benefits of competition among governments. After all,
does not a restriction of governmental competition by way, for example, of innocent looking
tax harmonisation, also define the circumstances of a conspiracy? The conspiracy is by the
political class against its principals, the voters. Interestingly, however, there are economists,
perhaps a majority, who do regard governmental competition in general and international tax
competition in particular as harmful. One might expect economists, because of their training
in the merits and power of competition, to systematically praise the virtues of competition
wherever it makes an appearance. Traditional economic policy analysts however deplore
international tax competition on the grounds that it imperils the provision of public goods and
government programs aimed at income redistribution. Moreover, they disapprove of the
structural effect of international tax competition, which tends to shift the burden of taxation
from capital, the more mobile factor, to labour, the less mobile factor. At the core of this
uneasiness with globalisation is the fear that the distributional consequences of globalisation-
induced tax competition will snowball into an erosion of the Welfare State’s social safety net.
Globalisation is thus perceived as debilitating governments, which is the only institution able
to hold together a civil society by containing market forces that are blind to higher social
objectives. At stake is, according to the French futurist Jacques Attali (1997), nothing less
than the future of Western civilisation. A more sober but essentially similar assessment is
made by the prominent German economist Hans-Werner Sinn (1997) who also comes to the
conclusion that governmental competition is often detrimental to social welfare, because if
"governments have stepped in where markets have failed, it can hardly be expected that a
reintroduction of a market through the backdoor of systems competition will work. It is likely
to bring about the same kind of market failure that justified government intervention in the
first place” (p. 248).3
The traditional school of economic policy analysis predicts that globalisation will give
rise to predatory competition between the governments of the European nation states. The
consequence is anticipated to be a marked reduction in, if not the destruction of, the
benevolent Welfare State, and the creation of social tensions that ironically could jeopardise
the hitherto achieved market integration of Europe, which in turn has been the very cause of
governmental competition. This line of reasoning regarding the impending doom of
benevolent social institutions has been forcefully promoted by Dani Rodrik in his monograph
titled Has globalisation gone too far?. The policy recommendations that follow from this
view call for a consolidation of the Welfare State through the co-ordination and harmonisation
of economic policies at the supranational European level. The advocates of this harmonization
believe that the globalisation of the European economies needs to be accompanied by a –
probably Franco-German led – drive towards European centralisation.
3
Since their power and prominence would increase if the above diagnosis was to be
adopted, the main institutions of the EU – the European Commission, the European Court,
and the European Parliament – would be more than happy to proceed with greater
harmonisation or even centralisation in response to the increase in government competition
due to globalisation. Some observers suspect that the willingness of these institutions to take
on responsibilities is not driven by default but by design. The German Euro-critic Roland
Vaubel (1999) has observed that the Commission and the Court pursued market integration
with zeal and sometimes ostensibly against the will of the member states. Just as important in
the establishment of the common market as the direct personal benefits was, according to
Vaubel, the anticipated increase in regulatory power when member states, in an attempt to
protect themselves from the greater external political competition, demanded extensive
harmonisation or centralisation of economic policy. 
Different reasons can be suggested for the so often heard demand for harmonised or
centralised European economic policies. In the final analysis, the assessment of the4
competitive pressure imposed on the European governments by continuing economic
integration depends to a large degree on the observer’s view of political life. If one views
governments not as healers of all sorts of market failures but as a source of political failures,
one is led to the conclusion that the increase in government competition in Europe should not
be jeopardized by endorsing schemes that would create cartels or monopolise decision-
making about economic policies. The devolution of political power that accompanies
European economic integration is rather welcomed. This is, of course, the view taken by the
political economy school of thought that endorses the public choice approach to government,
where government is viewed as composed of people with personal interests and objectives.
The traditional school of policy analysis adopts a more static view of governmental
competition, emphasising potential short run efficiency losses related to international tax
evasion. Political economy analysis stresses the dynamic aspects, in particular the
intermediate-run efficiency gains from the incentive effects of competition and the long-run
gains from the discovery of more efficient policies in a political environment characterised by
diversity and lively interaction. 
One incentive for governments to compete among themselves was suggested by
various extensions of the seminal model developed by Charles Tiebout (1956) regarding the
mobility of citizens in federal systems. The incentive effect, however, goes beyond the
mobility that is the source of horizontal competition in the Tiebout model. The incentive
effect of government competition is also present without voter mobility when voters can
observe government performance across jurisdictions and can sanction politicians whose
performance is inferior to that of others. The French economist Pierre Salmon (1987) was the
first to point out that such comparisons of political performance is perfectly analogous to the
incentive mechanisms (called a yardstick competition scheme) developed in labour
economics, which judges job performance by setting up a contest between employees with
comparable job assignments.5
Though the Tiebout mechanism applies only to competition among governments
inhabiting a given jurisdictional tier, the Salmon mechanism can, in principle, be extended to
explain competition among governments located at different levels of jurisdiction.
Globalisation puts significant constraints on the political leverage of European nation
states. Whether these constraints justify the frequently heard calls for policy harmonisation
and centralisation at the European level is, however, an open question. Rather
uncontroversial, on the other hand, is the proposal that any allocation of policy responsibilities
should be based on a wide democratic consensus among European citizens. The very success
of European economic integration thus calls for a fundamental rethinking of the future
political order in Europe. 
The objective of this contribution is to present the main arguments that have led us to
believe that a European constitution should not restrict but rather should encourage horizontal
and vertical governmental competition. In our view the European political order, in defining
the relationship among member states and also the relationship between the member states
and the EU, ought to be inspired by what we know about competition in the commercial
sphere. The above cited policy implication that Adam Smith drew from his observation of
business meetings is a precursor of modern competition or antitrust laws: “It is impossible
indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be
consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade
from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies;
much less to render them necessary.” We will argue that a European constitution confined to
simply emulating and adapting for the political sphere the existing competition or antitrust
laws represents a viable and welfare-promoting political order for 21
st century Europe.
4 
In section 3 we elaborate on the case for political competition in government systems.
Before doing this, we spell out in section 2 how globalisation allows governments leeway to
implement independent policies, which is after all a prerequisite of competition. Section 46
then analyses the channels through which globalisation influences government competition.
The concluding Section 5 presents some suggestions for European constitutional reform in the
age of globalisation.
2. Globalisation and the European Nation States
In recent decades, few economic issues have been debated as much as globalisation. These
debates have spawned immense popular and scientific literatures, and the sensationalist and
alarmist tone that characterises a large part of these debates has not always been restricted to
the commentaries written for more popular audiences (cf. Cohen, 1996, p. 296). In this section
we would like to shed some light on one allegation, to wit that economic globalisation
debilitates the nation state to the extent that it becomes ineffective in responding to domestic
political demands. Our case for extensive governmental competition in an economically
integrated Europe suggests that our conclusion will be different.
To begin with, there is no doubt that globalisation does have distinct effects on the
structure of public finance through both the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget. This
is so because actual and potential international mobility places additional constraints on
national governments. The constraints on taxation are the most obvious. Multinational
enterprises can, for example, move their activities to a foreign subsidiary, or they can
manipulate transfer prices to re-direct some of their domestically earned profits in low-tax
countries. Financial capital can escape taxation by moving abroad, and real capital can in the
long-run escape the domestic exchequer via direct foreign investment. Consumers may take
advantage of differences in excise or value added taxes by cross-border shopping and
nationals can relocate to a foreign country where income taxes are lower. The European
nation states thus begin to lose their monopoly on coercion and find themselves in a situation
of strategic interaction with their neighbours.7
The intensity of governmental competition depends on a factor’s degree of
international mobility. Labour is typically less mobile than capital. Financial capital is
extremely sensitive to tax-induced differences in net rates of return. Commodity arbitrage,
including smuggling, is mostly observed for expensive and highly taxed goods such as
cigarettes and alcohol. Mobility also has spatial as well as linguistic and cultural dimensions:
the Austrian and German labour markets are more integrated than the labour markets of Italy
and the UK simply because Austria and Germany have a common border and language.
Likewise, cross-border shopping is much less of a problem for the British than for the Dutch
government. As we noted at the outset, globalisation is not a uniform phenomenon. The
degree of market integration depends on the type of transaction and on location. This is the
reason why globalisation-induced government competition has such a strong influence not
only on the level but also on the structure of fiscal activities.
Let us first discuss the effect of globalisation on the size of the government budget.
International trade and capital market integration as well as international mobility of
consumers and income-tax payers reduce the ability of governments to finance publicly
provided goods. This is so especially if the governments’ redistribution objectives are not in
line with those of the population at large, if the tax monopoly is abused to exploit citizens, or
if there are incentives leading to slack administration and production. Competition reinforced
by globalisation disciplines governments and makes them more efficient.
Some scholars use the term efficiency effect to describe the reduction in public services
due to international tax competition.
5 Tax competition, however, influences only one side of
the market for government services, namely the supply side. To obtain a complete picture of
the influence of globalisation on the size of governments, we also need to look at the demand
side. The presumption must be that the demand for public spending, especially for income
transfer programmes, varies positively with the extent of globalisation, since insurance against
personal losses from market dislocations and policies to counteract income inequalities due to8
global economic integration become a political objective shared by more voters and interest
groups. The demand-side effect of globalisation thus increases public spending in order to
compensate the losers from globalisation – hence the term compensation effect.
The alarmist scenario of a globalisation-induced governmental quandary is predicated
on a one-sided examination that focuses exclusively on the efficiency effect, an efficiency
effect which is moreover assumed to affect all international transactions with full force. The
size of the government sector is, however, also influenced by the compensation effect: a
higher demand for public insurance against unforeseen structural effects and increased
international risk counters the higher costs of financing these services. Whether the supply or
the demand effect dominates cannot be determined theoretically, it is an empirical issue.
We now turn to the structural effects of globalisation on government budgets. From
the efficiency hypothesis, we expect that governmental competition will benefit mobile factors
of production, taxpayers, and consumers consequent on changes in tax policies. Immobile
factors, for example, are likely to be more heavily taxed than mobile factors. We should in
particular expect a higher tax burden for labour and reductions in tax rates for corporate
enterprises and high-income earners. Tax policies are, however, not the only instrument
available to governments to attract (say) factors of production. In a global environment,
governments compete by means of tax and expenditure policies. Public infrastructure may,
for example, be decisive for the profitability of an investment project. An exclusive focus on
taxes is therefore misleading. We rather expect competing governments to restructure their
expenditures to increase the productivity of mobile factors at the expense of public
consumption and social transfers.
The structural effects from the compensation hypothesis go in the opposite direction. It
leads us to expect governments to redirect their expenditures towards public services that
benefit victims of globalisation. If the economic risk increases as globalisation deepens, social
transfers should increase as well. In the light of the compensation hypothesis, taxes can be9
interpreted as insurance premia and social policies as insurance benefits. This kind of
redistribution can be justified by welfare theoretic arguments but can also be explained by
political-economic reasoning. For example, the theory of economic regulation pioneered by
the Chicago school makes the point that windfall profits that accrue to a specific group from
an exogenous shock, as a rule, are redistributed to some extent even by selfish politicians to
those who lose from the shock. The reason for such political behaviour is that marginal
political support decreases with increasing income, whereas marginal political opposition
increases with decreasing income. The principle of political redistribution expressed as “share
the gain and share the pain” also underlies the compensation hypothesis.
Theoretical arguments as to whether globalisation undermines the Welfare State are
ambiguous and inconclusive. We therefore consider the empirical evidence. Econometric
studies that systematically link (capital) taxation and government expenditures to various
measures of goods and capital market integration are the most relevant.
6 Most of these studies
use data from the OECD countries and are thus readily applicable to the European context.
The studies investigating the relationship between globalisation and capital taxation
suffer from various methodological weaknesses. For example, some studies use tax revenue
instead of the effective tax rate as the dependent variable. Others use trade integration instead
of capital market integration as the crucial explanatory variable. Studies that use an indicator
of capital market integration usually resort to rather uninformative dummy variables. These
weaknesses notwithstanding, the studies allow us to tentatively conclude that globalisation did
not dramatically reduce capital tax rates. Corporate tax rates remained at a remarkably high
level considering the predictions usually associated with locational mobility. On the other
hand, a marked increase took place in labour taxes, which points to a structural effect of
globalisation. The standard tax competition model, which predicts a level effect, apparently
does not capture what is going on, whereas the observed structural effect is more in line with
the theoretical predictions. In any case, we interpret these results as indicating that the10
efficiency effect may well constrain government behaviour to some extent in the future, but
will not undermine the effectiveness of the basic government activities. 
This interpretation is confirmed by regression results on government expenditures.
Most studies fail to find a negative relationship between the extent of goods and capital
market integration and either the size of government measured as total government
expenditures or the social budget. Many of the results are in line with the compensation
hypothesis. The idea that globalisation preempts ideologically motivated social policies is also
not supported by the data. The results indicate instead that partisan characteristics still play an
important role in fiscal policy, and, most importantly for our concern, so do also the
democratic institutions that govern the interaction between government and economic
interests. Regressions presented by Vaubel (2000), for example, show that federal institutions
have a significantly negative impact on government spending and also on social transfers if
the extent of global market integration is properly taken into account.
Vaubel’s results indicate that political institutions continue to matter in a globalised
world. Globalisation therefore leaves nation states with a substantial margin for
experimentation and meaningful competition. The focus of Vaubel’s study on federal
institutions moreover points to an alternative way of examining the popular hypothesis that
deep market integration undermines policy independence in integrated jurisdictions. After all,
a rather similar hypothesis has been extensively investigated in the context of federal states
since Wallace Oates published his seminal book on fiscal federalism in 1972 and since
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan advocated fiscal competition as a device to discipline
Leviathan in their 1980 monograph on the power to tax.
The substantial literature on fiscal federalism and the size of the public sector is
surveyed by Gebhard Kirchgässner (2002) who comes to the conclusion that “taking all
currently available empirical evidence together ... we might conclude that there is some
evidence that fiscal federalism leads – ceteris paribus – to a smaller size of the government,11
but the evidence is far from being overwhelming.” This assessment is corroborated by the
empirical evidence on income redistribution in Switzerland presented by Lars Feld (2000).
Switzerland makes for an especially interesting country study because the Swiss federal
system allocates the fundamental responsibility for personal income and corporate taxation to
the lower-tiered governments, the cantons; moreover, observed taxation levels show a
substantial variation across cantons and even communities. It is, therefore, not surprising that
in Switzerland fiscally induced mobility applies mainly to high income earners, whereas in
the United States it applies mainly to potential welfare recipients. Even though government
competition in Switzerland is especially intense with respect to income taxation, the share of
income redistribution undertaken by the sub-national governments increased between 1977
and 1992. Moreover, the redistribution objective was achieved by an increased use of taxation
relative to expenditures. This is strong evidence that income redistribution is feasible in
decentralised systems, even if the competing governments are deeply integrated in a common
market. One might add, following Feld’s assessment, that the Swiss example also indicates
that a redistribution policy needs to be based on a broad popular consent – in the Swiss case
achieved by a direct democratic political process – to be viable if inter-jurisdictional mobility
is high. This is an insight which we believe has strong implications for European
constitutional design.
We thus arrive at the conclusion that competition among governments is quite
compatible with market integration. We acknowledge that our view is mainly based on the
fiscal competition literature. We have focused on fiscal policy, firstly, because the ability of
governments to conduct income redistribution is absolutely crucial when discussing the
viability of decentralised policy making in the age of globalisation. The second reason is
simply that much more is known about fiscal competition that about government competition
through (say) regulatory policies.12
We might add, however, that the empirical evidence does in particular not support the
popular doomsday view of globalisation regarding environmental regulation. The fear that
increasing capital mobility will give rise to a downward competition of environmental
standards in order to attract productive capital has been the foundation for the so-called
ecological dumping debate. The empirical evidence shows that differences in environmental
standards have neither a significant impact on the pattern of trade nor on the flow of foreign
direct investment. The data do reveal however that trade policy exerts a significant influence
on environmental quality: (developing) economies that are more integrated in the world
markets suffer – ceteris paribus – less from pollution than more closed economies.
7
Having cleared the way for our recommendation of a federal Europe composed of
competing governments, we are now ready to describe the mechanism of the envisaged
political order.
3. On Political Competition in Governmental Systems
There are two glaring inconsistencies in the conventional microeconomic modeling of
economic behaviour – inconsistencies to which many non-economists and, ironically, many
intellectuals, adhere. First, as producers, labourers, investors, consumers, and in many of the
other roles they play, individuals are viewed as pursuing, in the most efficient way possible,
ends which increase their profits, incomes, wealth, and utility. They are presumed, in other
words, to be motivated to seek their own interests and, in addition, to do so with a minimum
of resources. Then, without skipping a beat, as politicians and public sector bureaucrats,
individuals are presumed to be consumed by a desire to maximize the common good or some
index of social welfare. They are viewed, to put it differently, as selfless persons while also
driven to be efficient in the use of resources.
The first inconsistency is related to the assumptions of selfishness and selflessness. It
becomes immediately apparent as soon as we take note of the fact that many politicians and13
public sector bureaucrats have been, in their past, private producers, market labourers, and/or
investors, and in the present all are consumers. The implied schizophrenia, dependent
exclusively on the imputation of roles, is unacceptable. It is imperative that all actors, in
whatever role they are cast, be viewed as either selfish or selfless. Though there are altruistic
and public-spirited individuals in the world, in constructing models that can help understand
behaviour, in formulating rules to guide action, and in designing policies, there can be little
doubt that the assumption that individuals are principally motivated by their own interests is
the most productive.
The first inconsistency is father (or mother) to the second. We have known since Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) – with elaborations and refinements added on as economics
became more systematic – that if self-seeking behaviour is kept in check – in effect, regulated
or controlled – by competition, it can yield beneficial results.
8 This is the famous invisible
hand theorem. It has corollaries. One of them is that if individuals and organizations pursue
their interests – while abiding by rules that are virtually all related to property and contract
law – that pursuit begets competition.
In the analysis of public sector behaviour – in Public Economics (formerly Public
Finance), Welfare Economics, and even in Public Choice Theory – governments are (almost
always tacitly) assumed to be monopolists.
9 If we suppose, as we must, that those who inhabit
the supply side of the public sector are persons and organizations like those we find in the
marketplace and elsewhere in society – that is, persons and organizations that seek their own
interest – it would appear that we are left with a situation in which no constraint exists to
regulate behaviour. But we are not. The corollary of Smith's invisible hand theorem must be
assumed to kick in.
There are in real world democracies some instances in which politicians and bureaucrats
are more or less unconstrained or seem to be, but those instances are fewer than appears to the
untrained eye – to the eye that has not learnt to detect the manifestations of competitive14
behaviour. In most situations, the actors on the supply side are constrained. In some cases, the
constraints may be only weakly binding, but it is seldom the case that public sector actors are
free to do what they want. The constraints are of two sorts: a) electoral contests at more or
less regular time intervals; and b) checks and balances. These two features – both necessary
for the existence of a democratic order – promote and encourage competition. 
Though there is still considerable confusion, even at the highest levels of debate, about
electoral rules and especially about how the product of these rules are influenced by the
political institutions in which they are incorporated and, in turn, help mould these institutions,
there is general familiarity with elections and the sort of competition they beget. The same
cannot be said about checks and balances. To get a handle on the realities which these
concepts capture, it is essential to accept two propositions. First, that checks and balances are
not a characteristic of the American system of government and of that system alone – they are
a feature of all governmental systems. Second, that governments are not monolithic bodies,
but instead are compound structures made up of a large number of autonomous and quasi-
autonomous elected and non-elected centres of power. Of special interest for the present
discussion are the centres of power which come to mind when we think of decentralized (and
federalized) governmental systems – the central governmental institutions, the member states
(countries, provinces, states, cantons, republics, etc.), and the even more remote peripheral
bodies.
There is no better way of understanding what is meant by checks and balances than to
refer to Epaminondas Panagopoulos's (1985) superb summary of the evolution, over the last
two millennia, of the discussions that eventually clarified these difficult concepts. Three
interconnected ideas, central to the history of this evolution, are particularly important for the
present discussion. All three relate to the relationship between checks on the one hand and
balances on the other (for a detailed discussion of the matter, see Breton, 1996, Chapter 3).15
The first is the notion that to have the capacity to check it is necessary that the centres of
power that constitute compound governments be balanced or "equipoised" vis-à-vis each other;
hence the concentration of the literature on the separation and distribution of powers and
responsibilities and on the division and dispersion of political power among the centres that
make-up compound governments. Over the years, the institutions that provided the background
to the reflections first of the Greeks, then of the Romans, followed by the Venetians, the
Florentines, the British, the French and the Americans, kept changing, but the preoccupation,
throughout, remained focussed on the necessity of guaranteeing balance between ever new
constellations of centres of power, on the means of achieving that balance, and on the
consequences of moving away from it. The position we take in this paper is that one should
identify the notion of balance with that of autonomy or quasi-autonomy which derives from a
properly understood idea of the separation of powers.
The second idea - in fact, an implicit assumption - that is central to the history of the
debates on checks and balances is that if centres of power are balanced, they will necessarily
check each other. The burden of this assumption is that if the institutions are balanced or
equipoised, the behaviour adopted by participants in the political process will, of necessity, be
characterised by the use of checks. Checking behaviour, in other words, derives from balance.
The assumption found its way naturally and unobtrusively in the discussions no doubt because
the analysts were primarily concerned with the problem of balance - that is, with the problem of
institutional design - and also, one surmises, because they were observing that equipoised and
hence autonomous and quasi-autonomous centres of power in fact checked each other. It is,
however, an unfortunate assumption for at least two reasons. First, it easily leads one to the view
that the capacity to check derives from institutional arrangements and from legal and
constitutional dispositions alone and not also from the productivity of the resources allocated to
the use of checking instruments and from the responses of citizens to the use of these
instruments. Second, it induces one to disregard the possibility of collusion between sub-sets of16
centres once a separation of powers, and hence balance, is achieved – collusion which is often
disguised as harmonisation.
The third idea which drove many of the protagonists engaged in the millennial debates on
checks and balances follows from the first two. It is that balancing is a 'substitute' of sorts for
checking and that, as a consequence, one need be concerned with only one of the two, especially
if one's primary preoccupation is the design of a 'good' compound government. This, too, helps
us understand why the literature is largely focussed on balances. It will transpire, as we proceed,
that checks and balances are related, but it should also become clear that the relationship between
the two realities is a complicated one. It might be better to sometimes use the words checks and
balances and at other times the words checks and counter checks to describe that particular
dimension of political competition.
For many persons the concept of political competition is unacceptable. The realities that
it evokes are, to them, unsavory. In addition, in the minds of many laypersons, competition is
incompatible with, and even antithetical to cooperation, that is to the execution of actions
leading to coordination. With this as background, the idea that governmental centres of power
compete among themselves is often thought to be impertinent and cynical. It will be useful
therefore to examine briefly the types of behaviour which are generally associated with
checking and counter checking.
We have already noted that economic models of perfect and imperfect competition have
for many years been applied to politics. We mention two applications. In the perfect
competition tradition, Charles Tiebout (1956) assumes the existence of numerous local
governments supplying goods and services for which a demand exists, which are compelled
by the competition of other local governments to supply these goods and services efficiently
at tax prices equal to their marginal costs. Competition in this context is between local
governments (the counterpart of firms) for the patronage of mobile citizens (the analog of
consuming households). Competition insures that both local governments and citizens behave,17
at least if the costs of mobility are low, as price-takers. In the imperfect competition tradition,
Anthony Downs (1957) models the rivalry of political parties along the lines of the locational
or spatial competition theory suggested by Harold Hotelling (1929).
To gain further insights into the kinds of behaviour associated with competition and
competitiveness, it is helpful to complement the models of perfect and imperfect competition
just noted with the model of competition proposed by Joseph Schumpeter (1911, 1942) and
other Austrian economists, which we may call the model of entrepreneurial competition. To
model Schumpeterian entrepreneurial competition, one must distinguish between two central
components There is first a steady-state "circular flow" equilibrium in which the marginal
equalities on the supply side (see, Samuelson, 1982, pp. 10-11), those on the demand side, and
the equality of supply and demand over all markets are satisfied. The steady-state circular
flow can be characterized as "a stationary solution to a dynamical process" (Samuelson, 1943,
p. 61) in which 'the same things' keep repeating themselves. The circular flow equilibrium,
therefore, is a long-run neoclassical equilibrium and the competitive behaviour which obtains
in that equilibrium is that of neoclassical theory.
The second component is associated with innovation and entrepreneurship on the one
hand and with imitation on the other. Schumpeter, in his later work, identified innovative
behaviour with "Creative Destruction" (capitals in the original) which, through "the
introduction of a new good", "the introduction of a new method of production", "the opening
of a new market", "the conquest of a new source of supply", and "the carrying out of the new
organization of any industry" (Schumpeter, 1911, p. 66), brings forth new 'things' and
eliminates others. Creative destruction derives from and indeed defines entrepreneurship.
Innovation, when it is successful and therefore profitable, induces others, covetous of the
innovational rents, to imitate the actions of entrepreneurs either by simple duplication or by
producing substitutes. In the process, the imitators increase the demand for labor, capital and
other factors of production, thus pushing up their prices and the entire schedule of average18
costs. By increasing the supply of goods and services, they push down their prices. The
increase in unit costs and the fall in supply prices eventually eliminate the rents of
entrepreneurship and bring forth the circular flow equilibrium of neo-classical theory.
We must now recognize that the entrepreneurial innovation which sets the competitive
process in motion, the imitation which follows, and the Creative Destruction that they
generate are not inconsistent with cooperative behaviour and the coordination of activities. It
would be a mistake, however, to focus on these acts of cooperation and coordination and
conceive of Creative Destruction as the outcome of a cooperative process. In looking for new
technologies, supply sources, organizational forms, products, methods of finance, labour-
management relations and other new ways of solving supply problems, entrepreneurs will
consult with other people, collaborate with them on certain projects, harmonize various
activities and even integrate some operations. All these actions describe what is generally
meant by cooperation and coordination. If these activities serve to bring forth new
innovations, they serve to foster competition. Indeed, to the extent that cooperation and
coordination make it possible for innovations to come on stream more rapidly than they
would otherwise, they become a force in the process of Creative Destruction. As a general
rule, we can say that in the absence of collusion, cooperation and competition can and will
generally co-exist and also that the existence of one is not proof of the absence of the other. In
particular, we can say that the observation of cooperation and coordination does not deny that
the underlying determining force is competition.
The stationary element (the neoclassical circular flow) and the dynamical process (the
innovational-imitational mechanics) both apply to political life as much as they do to
economic life. Indeed, there are politicians and other public sector actors who, like some of
their counterparts in the business world, are entrepreneurs and who therefore innovate by
creating new goods and services, by introducing new techniques of production, exploring for
new sources of supply, devising new methods of financing their operations, designing and19
instating new organizational forms, inaugurating new promotion methods, discovering new
ways of obtaining information about the preferences of their constituents as well as by
originating new ways of achieving a better match between the volume and the quality of
goods and services provided and the volume and quality desired by citizens.
These political entrepreneurs often achieve their ends by forming a new consensus, by
introducing symbols capable of producing solidarity, by galvanizing popular energies in the
face of an emergency and, last but not least, by creating, adapting and cultivating "ideologies"
which, following Downs (1957, p. 96), we can define as "verbal image[s] of the good society
and of the chief means of constructing such a society" or, following Joseph Kalt and Mark
Zupan (1984, p. 281) as the "more or less consistent sets of normative statements as to best or
preferred states of the world".
How does entrepreneurial competition relate to checking behaviour? Checking is used by
centres of power to extract concessions from other centres and to force them to compromise on
initial positions. To put it differently, a centre of power undertakes to check another centre in
order to oblige the latter to compromise. The often repeated dictum that 'politics is the art of
compromise' is a backhanded endorsement of the view that politics is competitive and that a
primary means of competition is the use of checks, since no one would compromise unless
forced to do so. Concessions and compromises, we insist, cannot be conceived as pertaining
exclusively to the negative actions of giving up on, backing down from, or renouncing an initial
position; they must also and, we suggest, principally be thought of as belonging to the class of
positive activities associated with innovative Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. In other words,
for a politician to compromise is to come up with something else, with an alternative that meets
the objection of the centre of power that made use of the check, while also meeting the
preferences of one's own constituency. 
If the foregoing is applied to intergovernmental relations in decentralized governmental
systems, it is important to begin by distinguishing between horizontal and vertical20
competition. In standard theory the distinction is not made, except in a most off-handed way.
It restricts its attention to the first and assumes that the motor behind this horizontal
intergovernmental competition is the interjurisdictional mobility of persons and capital
searching for the best and lowest cost bundle of goods and services. The assumption has its
roots in the early work of Tiebout (1956). Whether interjurisdictional mobility is strong
enough a force to motivate intergovernmental competition is not known, however. If, as is
generally believed by American scholars, it is powerful enough to do so in the United States,
we agree with Dieter Bös (1983) that it does not have that power in the other decentralized
governmental systems found in the rest of the world. However, were the mobility mechanism
powerful enough to motivate horizontal competition, comprehensive competition would still
be absent, because mobility has nothing to do with the problem of the assignment of powers
to different jurisdictional tiers.
10 To deal with this problem we need to refer to vertical
competition and to the fact that even if individuals are able to move from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction they cannot move from one jurisdictional tier to another. In decentralized systems,
one is a citizen of all the tiers that are constitutive of the governmental system. Therefore, if
competition exists between tiers, it cannot be the result of mobility.
As noted in the Introduction, a decade and a half ago, Pierre Salmon (1987) applied the
theory of labour tournaments initially proposed by Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981)
to horizontal intergovernmental competition arguing, in effect, that if the citizens of a
jurisdiction evaluate the performance of their government by comparing it to the performance
of governments elsewhere but at the same jurisdictional tier, they would induce their own
government to do as well or better than these governments and in the process would prompt
their governing politicians to compete with opposition politicians. One virtue the Salmon
mechanism, in addition to the fact that it is a complement to the Tiebout mechanism whenever
that last mechanism is operative, is that it will also motivate vertical competition whenever21
citizens use the performance of governments located at other jurisdictional tiers as
benchmarks to evaluate what their own government is doing.
The initial formulation of the Salmon mechanism and, to our knowledge, all subsequent
formulations, assumed that citizens compared the performance of their own government to
that of a benchmark government in terms of the "levels and qualities of services, of levels of
taxes or of more general economic and social indicators" (Salmon, 1987, p. 32). However, as
argued by Breton (1996), competition in governmental systems compels all centres of power
to forge Wicksellian connections (defined in the next two paragraphs) that are as tight as
possible so as to be granted the consent (vote) of citizens.
11 In the light of this result, we
suggest that citizens evaluate the relative performance of governments in terms of the
tightness of Wicksellian connections – both for horizontal and vertical competition.
What are Wicksellian connections and why is it an improvement to articulate the Salmon
mechanism on them rather than on the vector of goods, services, taxes, and other indicators on
which the mechanism has hitherto been articulated? A Wicksellian connection is a link
between the quantity of a particular good or service supplied by centres of power and the
taxprice that citizens pay for that good or service. Knut Wicksell (1896) and Erik Lindahl
(1919) showed that if decisions regarding public expenditures and their financing were taken
simultaneously and under a rule of (quasi) unanimity, a perfectly tight nexus between the two
variables would emerge. Breton (1996, passim) argued that competition between centres of
power, if it was perfect and not distorted by informational problems, would also generate
completely tight Wicksellian connections. In the real world, competition is, of course, never
perfect and informational problems abound, and as a consequence Wicksellian connections
are less than perfectly tight. Still, as long as some competition exists, there will be
Wicksellian connections.
The virtue of a Salmon mechanism expressed in terms of Wicksellian connections is that
a given citizen can carry out comparisons of performance in terms of a common standardized22
variable, whether the benchmark government inhabits the same or a different jurisdictional
level from that in which the citizen dwells. A variable that serves that purpose well is the size
of the utility losses inflicted on citizens whenever the volume of goods and services provided
by centres of power differs from the volume desired at given taxprices. Put differently,
citizens experience the same kind of utility losses from decisions made by governments
whatever the jurisdictional tier the governments inhabit. The goods and services supplied can
differ, but the efforts to achieve tightness in Wicksellian connections will not.
12 Indeed, the
ability to compare performance horizontally is likely to reinforce the ability to execute
vertical comparisons and vice versa.
How does vertical competition manifest itself? When powers are assigned to different
levels of government, the assignment is never precise or explicit enough to cover all possible
contingencies. Adapting the theory of contracts, which says that a contract is incomplete
whenever its meaning, though obvious to the signatories of the document, is ambiguous to
third parties, we could say that assignments are always incomplete in the sense that even if
their meaning was absolutely transparent to those who drafted and endorsed the initial
constitutional document, that meaning can no longer be clear to successor generations that are
the de facto third parties of contract theory. Constitutions or other documents that spell out the
assignment of powers are therefore, of necessity, also imprecise. As a consequence, it is
always possible for governments at one jurisdictional tier to invade
13 – to make inroads,
incursions, or forays into – the policy domain of governments located at a different tier. The
invasions need not actually take place – it is sufficient that they be possible. It is easy to
provide evidence confirming that governments, more or less continuously, invade the policy
domains of governments inhabiting other tiers. In Canada and the United States, external
affairs is a federal (or national) power, though many provinces and states have representation
abroad. Education, in most federal states, is an exclusive provincial or state responsibility,23
though in most if not all instances, central governments play a role. Cases of constitutional
invasions in Italy are described in Breton and Fraschini (forthcoming).
4. Globalisation and Government Competition in Europe
Globalisation is driven by two different influences: purposeful political action and
technological innovation. These two influences, in turn, shape five channels through which
globalisation impacts on governmental competition. In this section, we describe these five
channels.
A first channel acts as conduit for the Tiebout mechanism, and involves the
consequences for government competition and the survival of the European Welfare States as
EU citizens become increasingly mobile. In the absence of the opportunity to relocate,
politically weak groups of citizens find it impossible to escape involuntary redistribution.
They can reduce their exposure to an offensive tax, but the ability to substitute away from a
taxable activity is often limited. In a globalised environment exploited minorities have the
means of  “voting with their feet” to move to a jurisdiction in which the Wicksellian
connections are more to their liking. In the limit, with perfect mobility, perfect information,
perfect divisibility, and with scale economies appropriately utilized, voter-mobility results in a
first best solution; mobility “acts like a silent unanimity rule and produces the same outcome
as we would expect under this voting rule in an immobile world” (Dennis Mueller, 1998, p.
177). This implies that redistribution programmes that are not supported by voters at large
will tend to disappear as voter mobility increases, whereas generally accepted redistribution
programmes will survive. Notice, that redistribution programmes that are sustainable in a
globalised environment do not need universal acceptance but rather general acceptance by the
voters in the jurisdiction in which the redistribution takes place. Globalisation may thus well
reduce the size of the Welfare State, but only by eliminating programmes which lack popular
support. 24
A second channel, which accommodates globalisation-induced mobility of goods,
factor inputs, and consumers, is associated with international tax evasion. A precondition for
the mobility of tax bases is, of course, extensive liberalisation of international market access.
International transactions, however, will only take place in a liberalised environment if
incentives exist to undertake cross-border transactions. Capital, for example, will only flow
readily across borders if technologies to administer and monitor the foreign investments are
available. The breaking-up of production chains within multinational enterprises, the just-in-
time import of inputs, and the efficient management of international portfolios is a viable
alternative to domestic transactions only if the additional costs of international transactions do
not exceed the cost reduction offered by the  access available to foreign markets. Only if the
political will to liberalise international markets is accompanied by a general availability of
advanced information and communication technologies can we expect market integration to
generate effective competition among governments. These conditions appear to be
increasingly satisfied in Europe at the onset of the 21
st century.
Most theoretical studies that look favourably on international tax competition assume
that governments, in financing public goods, are restricted to using taxes that can be evaded
through international transactions. If this assumption is coupled with the classical benevolent-
dictator portrait of government, one necessarily arrives at the result of an under-provision of
public services due to free-riding behaviour on the part of some tax-payers through capital tax
evasion, cross-border shopping, and so on. The benevolent dictator presumption of the
standard approach to modelling international tax competition leads to the conclusion that
governmental competition cannot provide efficiency gains and imposition of artificial
restrictions on one (internationally mobile) tax base neglects the possibility of shifting the tax
burden to a base that is less exposed to free-riding. In a model that allows for competition-
induced efficiency gains and for tax schemes that specifically charge the beneficiaries of
publicly provided services, international tax competition clearly increases the efficiency of the25
public sector and reduces the Welfare State to programs that find the approval of the citizens
at large.
We are led to agree with Dennis Mueller (1998, p. 182) regarding the advocates of the
traditional normative theory of economic policy analysis who pose as impartial observers who
“know what the proper level of taxation for the country should be and how this money should
be spent, and fear that any loss in tax revenue will harm these programs. Such fears are
unfounded, if governments provide the goods and services their citizens want, and use benefit
taxes to finance them.”
A third channel through which globalisation affects international government
competition is through the Salmon mechanism. To understand how governmental
accountability depends on the degree of global economic integration, consider the member
states of the European Union whose governments provide a given set of goods financed with
some tax scheme, and assume that the transformation of tax revenues into public services is
subject to a country-specific shock that is not observed by the voters. If the shocks are
completely uncorrelated across countries, the voters can base their evaluation of domestic
government performance only on the observed performance in terms of the Wicksellian
connection between taxes paid and services received. Under these circumstances, politicians
face a rather weak re-election constraint. The political agency problem strongly favours the
agents, namely the political class, who must be presumed to use their political leeway to pay
off pressure groups who provide them with political support, indulge in their ideological
proclivities, enjoy the easy life of an unconstrained agent, or simply plod along.
The scenario changes dramatically if economic integration gives rise to a positive
correlation among shocks across European countries. After all, the common European market
is characterised not only by the feature of common access but also by the fact that the
individual economies become increasingly indistinguishable and begin to share a common
European quality. This is so because trade and capital market integration have, over time,26
blurred the internal structural differences between the economies that used to have distinct
national characteristics, and the European Monetary Union has taken care of the country-
specific external shocks in the form of different exchange rate exposures. European economic
integration is thus accompanied by more homogeneous exogenous shocks for national
political-economic systems. In the limit with individual shocks perfectly correlated, this
homogeneity in shocks would result in optimal Wicksellian connections in all countries,
because the Salmon mechanism among the national governments would provide each
government with an incentive to do better than their peers. We would end up with a first-best
equilibrium in the tradition of Bertrand. To be sure, the country specific shocks will never be
perfectly correlated, but some correlation will help voters gather information on the relative
performance of their government so that they can respond to bad local political performance
on election day.
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The same reasoning applies to vertical competition which emerges if the nation-state
governments and the supra-national (European) government provide public services that share
common features in production. If one attempts to integrate the Government of Europe into
the framework of governmental competition, it is of great importance that the policy
responsibilities of that European government not be isolated from the policy responsibilities
of member-state governments by way of assigning to the European government
responsibilities that member states can no longer access. A wrongly understood and
incompetently implemented subsidiarity principle is liable to throttle vertical government
competition that represents an indispensable mechanism for enhancing incentive compatibility
at the European level.
Empirical evidence relating to the impact of the  Salmon mechanism is available for
some federal countries. In federal systems the performance of the junior governments is
sufficiently comparable so that the voters can alleviate the agency problem by making
meaningful comparisons between jurisdictions. In their classical article Timothy Besley and27
Anne Case (1995) analyse U.S. state data and find that vote-seeking and tax-setting are indeed
tied together through the nexus of what they call political yardstick competition. Similar
results have also been derived for several European countries.
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Of course, the Salmon mechanism can only work properly if the governments do not
collude. This caveat also applies to mobility-induced governmental competition described
above, but the conditions for a successful government cartel are especially favourable in the
case of yardstick competition because the increase in political support deriving from
aggressive yardstick competition wears off relatively fast compared to the more lasting gains
derived from the attraction of valuable factors of production. In any case, the possibility of
collusion among governments needs to be taken into account whenever the political order in a
globalised world is discussed. Moreover, there cannot be any doubt that governmental
competition needs to rely even more heavily on  political institutions set up to supervise and
enforce political competition when competition is vertical. A European constitutional
assembly thus needs to address the issue of encouraging political competition not only among
member states but also among governments of the member states and the EU government. 
Closely related to vertical competition within the hierarchical levels of compound
governments is the fourth channel linking globalisation to government competition.
Hierarchical governmental structures exhibit incentive effects similar to hierarchies in private
enterprises where promotion to a senior position is coupled to an above-average job
performance at the junior level. This kind of promotion mechanism is also at work in federal
states if the top political assignments at the federal level go to contenders who have
documented outstanding performance in junior governments. This appears to be the case in
many federal states. Contenders for the United States presidency, for example, have often a
track record as state governors, viable candidates for the position of the Federal Chancellor in
Germany depend on a strong performance as prime minister of one of the “Länder”, and many
Swiss Federal Counsellors have successfully served in a cantonal government. With28
increasing political integration, a position in the European government will become the prize
of a successful political career and will be more and more valued. The German slander for a
politician who has outlasted his days “Hast du einen Opa, schick ihn nach Europa” (If you
have a grandpa, send him to Europe) is already now a thing of the past. The high valuation of
EU-level government assignments, coupled with increasing globalisation-induced
comparability of government performance in the European nation states, will undoubtedly
give rise to stronger horizontal and vertical governmental competition if the future political
order in Europe is designed in such a way that this promotion mechanism can make an
impact. An obvious way to achieve this objective is to have EU government positions decided
through general elections.
Political fragmentation and decentralisation are a prerequisite for government
competition, but entrepreneurial innovation sets the competitive process in motion. As we
have argued above, globalisation consolidates isolated political-economic systems and
thereby sets the stage for governmental competition. But economic integration also stimulates
political innovation and entrepreneurship. This is the last channel of influence that we discuss.
First of all, it is important to notice that the processes of innovation and competition reinforce
each other: on the one hand innovation gives rise to competition, on the other hand
competition drives entrepreneurial behaviour. A political order that attempts to promote
innovation thus needs to take advantage of all possibilities to stir competition. In the European
context this means that a constituent assembly should understand that even in the age of
globalisation-induced governmental competition, political fragmentation and decentralisation
are not tantamount to inescapable political divergence; that globalisation provides the
European political system with the innovation incentives essential for regaining a leading
position in the global political arena; and that globalisation facilitates the transmission of
political innovations via imitation so that the whole political system will profit from local
instances of progress. Europe’s constitutional thinkers should remember that Western Europe,29
from the age of enlightenment until the industrial revolution, used to be the most dynamic of
the globe’s regions. According to the economic historian Eric Jones, Western Europe
achieved this leading role because competition among the European states did not suppress
unorthodox thoughts and the states were open enough to cross-fertilise each another.
16 Taking
this episode as an example, the designers of a new European political order are well advised
not to stifle globalisation-induced governmental competition in a time when Europe can ill
afford to forgo the favourable conditions for innovation  and growth that accompany
competitive governments.
5. Some Markers for Constitutional Design
The theory of constitutional design is still very much in a state of flux. Basic questions remain
without agreed upon answers, and some questions are not even asked. There is, for example,
no agreement on the role and function of the judiciary in interpreting constitutional
documents. Nor is there any consensus on the degree to which constitutional rules should be
binding. Should the provisions of constitutions be specific or general? Should constitutions
evolve to mirror changing ethical, social, political, and economic realities? or should the
"original intent" prevail? If the latter, how does one ascertain this original intent? These are
just a few of the questions begging for answers.
It is in a context of this sort that we venture to formulate some markers that could
serve as guides for the formulation of a constitution for Europe. Our selection will, of
necessity, be incomplete, but points in a direction that favours individual freedom, public
policy innovation, and flexibility to meet the challenges of a constantly and rapidly changing
world.
At least since Tocqueville's (1835-1840) Democracy in America, the view has been
incessantly repeated (see, among others, Oates, 1972, 1999; Begg et al., 1993) that the
centralisation of a power implies a uniform implementation of the policies nested in that30
power. That belief has been adhered to in the face of evidence from all the federal countries
centralisation does not entail uniformity of policies. In Canada for example, the policies
designed and executed by the federal government regarding the country's oceans – the
Atlantic, the Arctic, and the Pacific – are specific to each ocean, that is they vary from one
ocean to the other. The same is true in respect of the fisheries, agriculture, unemployment
insurance, etc. In matters such as monetary policy, national defence, and passports, uniformity
is the rule. Technical considerations and circumstances dictate the extent of uniformity, not
whether the power is centralised or not.
Some powers have to be centralised. When deciding to do so, it is important to be
respectful of diversity and to stay away from uniform provisions as much as is efficiently
possible. In other words, the benefits of uniformity should be compared with costs, and net
benefits should be maximised. The same holds true with respect to harmonisation. Sometimes
this entails considerable uniformity, but it is often possible to harmonise while being
respectful of diversity. A good example of the latter are the EU-wide arrest warrants that have
been approved by the fifteen member states. The principle behind the agreement on the EU-
wide warrants – an element of harmonisation – is the mutual recognition of distinct national
legal systems – a respect for diversity. Another good example is provided by the development
of model legal frameworks, such as UNIDROIT, that can serve as guides to legal
arrangements and legal evolution.
The competitive devaluations of currencies and the tariff wars of the 1930's, as well as
the competitive downgrading of some television programming to maintain higher ratings, are
cases of races to the bottom. However, the history of the behaviour of exchange rates and of
barriers to trade in the post World War II period as well as the history of the cinema provide
evidence that such races are not inevitable. The elimination of races to the bottom in regard to
exchange rates and tariffs seems to be attributable to the creation of international bodies and
to regimes (see Ruggie, 1983; Keohane, 1984) that regulate behaviour and to which all31
countries are committed. This is a question that is deserving of more attention. It would seem
that, in general, no one benefits from races to the bottom. When possible, agreements on
protocols that can prevent governments from such races should be devised without removing
the incentive to compete.
All decentralized governmental systems are made up of constituent units of unequal
size. New South Wales and Tasmania in Australia, Ontario and Prince Edward Island in
Canada, Germany and Luxembourg in the European Union, Uttar Pradesh and Sikkim in
India, California and Delaware in the United States, and so on. This disparity in size
negatively affects the modi operandi of checks and counter checks at both the horizontal and
vertical levels of intergovernmental relations – a consequence of a lack of balance. The
temptation is to deal with the biases identified with the operations on competition by
suppressing it. The challenge therefore is to invent institutions that make it possible for the
smaller units to compete effectively. The American or the Australian senate, made up of equal
numbers of senators from each state, is one such institution. The Canadian system of
Equalization Grants, which equalizes per capita revenues in the provinces is another.
At end of this exercise, it is surely superfluous to insist that, in designing a
constitution, care should be taken to remove all artificial barriers to mobility of goods,
services, capital, and people. In addition, institutions should be encouraged that will allow
citizens to evaluate the performance of their governments by comparing that performance at
the lowest cost possible with that of other governments in the Union.32
Endnotes
1 The authors thank Arye Hillman for helpful comments.
2 Adam Smith (1776), Book I, Ch. 10, paragraph 82.
3 See Section 5 for a discussion of the concepts of harmonisation and centralisation.
4 The view that constitutions of federal systems should, above all, regulate and supervise competition among the
lower-tiered governments has already been advanced by Breton (1987). In the 1990s this view has found some
support especially with German economists [cf. Vaubel (2000), note 5].
5 For a specific model of this efficiency effect derived from his theory of competitive governments, see Breton
(1998).
6 The respective literature is extensively surveyed in Schulze and Ursprung (1999). More recent results are to be
found in Bretschger and Hettich (forthcoming), Burgoon (2001), Cusack and Iversen (2000), and Vaubel (2000).
7 A recent survey on the theoretical and empirical literature on various topics in the field of international
environmental economics is to be found in Schulze and Ursprung (2001).
8 We write 'can yield' and not 'will yield' because assumptions related to, for example, returns to scale and
external effects are needed to generate the 'will yield'.
9 Below, we note two exceptions to that proposition.
10 In the Tiebout model and in the models that derive from that seminal contribution, the division of powers is a
consequence of the "span" of public goods – local public goods are assigned to local governments and the other
public goods to a central government which, however, plays no role in the models. This last point is powerfully
made in Keen (1998).
11 For a defense of that assumption see Breton (1996, pp. 48-57). See also the literature on probabilistic voting
in, for example, Calvert (1986).
12 As in the tournament model suggested by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), the comparison of performance will be
more precise if the random disturbances affecting performance are common to all centres of power instead of
being idiosyncratic to each.
13 We are in search of a vocabulary. We use the expressions invade and invasion – which may convey a sense of
hostility which is generally not part of the actions undertaken – for lack of a better term. In the discussion which
follows, invasions can be challenged before tribunals. Whether they are hostile or not is therefore not material.
14 A formal signal extraction model which gives rise to the described effects is to be found in Zantman (2000).
15 Cf. Ashworth and Heynels (1997) for Belgium, Büttner (2001) for Germany, Schaltegger and Küttel
(forthcoming) for Switzerland,
16 The volume edited by Bernholz et al. (1998) confronts the hypothesis that competition  of political systems has
been a crucial condition for innovation and prosperity in the history of mankind with empirical evidence from
selected periods of history.
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